LAW ENFORCEMENT MALFEASANCE AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS PDF

Becker, Gary S. and Stigler, George J. () “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 3: No. 1, Article . Loading data.. Open Bottom Panel. Go to previous Content Download this Content Share this Content Add This Content to Favorites Go to next Content. ← →. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” The Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (Jan., ): 1

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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers

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Other Papers By First Author. Ref Source Add To Collection. Ref 21 Source Add To Collection. The new approach asks why certain industries and not others become regulated or have tariffs imposed on imports or why income transfers take the form and direction they do, in contrast to asking which industries should be regulated or have tariffs imposed, or what transfers should be made.

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Are you looking for Incomplete Contracts and Endogenous Enforcement. Derek Neal 11 Estimated H-index: Ross Campbell University of Aberdeen. For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ivar Kolstad 4 Estimated H-index: David Mark Wilson Clemson University. THE new economic approach to political behavior seeks to develop a positive theory of legislation, in contrast to the normative approach of welfare economics.

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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers

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