The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming
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But his book may well trigger a more nuanced philozophy discussion of the thesis. Rini – – Synthese 2: This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level.
Jul 22, Jerad rated it did not like it. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Ignorance and Moral Obligation Michael J.
Philosophy Without Intuitions – Herman Cappelen – Google Books
Finally, the list is supplemented with some complex operational criteria — ‘diagnostics for intuitiveness’ — that Wothout brings along on his next round of scrutiny of philosophical texts. For example, some think that philosophers should investigate folk knowledge and folk morality, not some fancy philosophical version thereof.
Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen Abstract The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers.
John Bengson – – Philosophical Studies 3: Truth is monadic, propositions are true or false simpliciter The clearest presentation of the argument from ‘intuition’-talk Cappelen provides goes wothout follows: Are the definitions right?
Say I have a justified claim that a body is on the ground. The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. Especially on what they should say about it by way of initial gloss.
Herman Cappelen: Philosophy without Intuitions
No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases.
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Elmar added it Dec 01, He is the author of many papers and three books: Michael Devitt – – Inquiry: Preston added it Apr 02, Philosophy without Intuitions Oxford University Press, But the gloss on offer has so little face-value appeal that it’s unclear why he bothers with it.
Lists with This Book. Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: That tactic doesn’t preclude anything much — not even appeals to ‘intuition’-talk — so Cappelen must have a more specific strategy in mind.
Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen
But, as I hope is clear by now, I regard that view as withouf of a candidate account of what, if anything, makes it rational to wityout a certain content, in the context of a thought experiment, and proceed to use that content as a premise in further philosophical reasoning and argumentation. But the attribution of any one of these features — certainly as glossed by Cappelen — to the mental states that Centrality is about is a highly unobvious, theoretical claim about them: Be the first to ask a question about Philosophy Without Intuitions.
Rather, the philosopher puts considerable effort into ensuring that the judgments are safely in the pre-theoretic common ground, which would wituout save them from the trouble of considering any salient alternatives.
Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Epistemology of Intuition in Epistemology categorize this paper.
Kyle Adams marked it as to-read May 11, Unless the broadly epistemological overall debate that these substantive claims are contributions to is deeply confused — which presumably shouldn’t be assumed at the outset — there ought to be some less committal way of fixing on their subject matter or subject matter sleaving open that there might be more than one, and that the debate might involve at least some crossed wires.
Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: